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Techniques to Resolve Public Sector Bargaining
Disputes
CHARLES B. CRAVER*
28 OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 45 (2013)

I. INTRODUCTION
Labor organizations have existed in the United States for over two
centuries. In the late 1700s and early 1800s craft guilds consisting of skilled
artisans operated apprenticeship programs and maintained professional
1
standards. Such collective efforts were not confined to private sector
personnel. During the 1830s, skilled craft workers employed at naval
2
shipyards organized. In 1881 skilled craft guilds formed the Federation of
Organized Trades and Labor Unions, which was transformed into the
3
American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1886. During this same period,
postal workers organized in a number of cities, and, in 1917, the AFL
4
chartered the National Federation of Federal Employees.
During this same period, state and local government personnel began to
organize. The Chicago Teachers Federation was established in 1898, and in
5
1916, the AFL chartered the American Federation of Teachers. The
6
International Association of Fire Fighters was chartered the following year.
Even though no state law authorized collective bargaining by government
personnel prior to 1959, the American Federation of State, County &
*Freda H. Alverson Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D.,
1971, University of Michigan; Master of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1968, Cornell
University School of Industrial and Labor Relations; B.S., 1967, Cornell University.
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See PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3–6 (1964).
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See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 215 (West 2d ed. 2011).
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See TAFT, supra note 1, at 93–94, 113–16.
See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 215–16.
See id. at 216.
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Municipal Employees (AFSCME) was active throughout the 1930s and
7
1940s. During this period, the percentage of government workers who were
8
members of labor organizations ranged from nine percent to thirteen percent.
In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to enact a law authorizing
9
public sector bargaining. Federal employees were provided with limited
bargaining rights by President Kennedy in 1962 under Executive Order
10
10,988. In the following years, many state legislatures enacted statutes
enabling state and local government employees to organize and to bargain
with their employers over their wages and working conditions. These
bargaining laws enabled millions of government workers to join labor
organizations. By the end of 2011, thirty-seven percent of government
11
employees were union members.
Federal employees have enjoyed only limited bargaining rights, under
Executive Orders 10,988 and 11,491 and Title VII of the Civil Service
12
Reform Act, with Congress determining their basic wages and fringe
benefits and managers determining basic departmental policies. On the other
hand, most state and local government personnel have the right to bargain
13
over their wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions. Although a few
states have authorized work stoppages by non-essential government
employees, most state laws have banned such job actions. A number of state
laws preclude bargaining over the basic missions of the departments involved

7

8

9

Id. at 217.
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Id. at 227.
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See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 228; Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3
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or the manner in which they carry out their functions. Nevertheless, public
sector labor organizations have been able to negotiate bargaining agreements
covering many important topics.

II. IMPACT OF LABOR UNIONS ON WORKER RIGHTS
The collective action of labor organizations has generally enhanced the
economic benefits obtained by represented employees. Through the so-called
“monopoly face,” unions have used their control over the supply of labor to
15
increase wages and fringe benefits. The compensation earned by unionized
workers tends to be five to twenty percent higher than the compensation
16
earned by their nonunion cohorts. This is especially true in industries where
union density is high. Unions have even had an indirectly positive impact on
the compensation earned by nonunion workers, due to the fact that their
employers provide them with more generous wages to discourage them from
17
unionizing.
Representative labor organizations have also advanced the fringe benefits
18
received by bargaining unit personnel. Unions have negotiated generous
defined–benefit pension plans and expansive health care coverage for the
19
persons they represent. Some have obtained employer-funded nonoccupational disability coverage, paid family and personal leave programs,
and other similar fringe benefits. Most nonunion employees now have only
defined–contribution pension plans and health care, coverage for which they
must contribute substantial premiums and which have elevated deductibles
and co-payments.
Even though the economic benefits that unions obtain for represented
employees are significant, it is important to recognize the critical noneconomic privileges provided by such entities. Almost all bargaining
agreements stipulate that employees may only be disciplined for “just
14

See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369,
1384–90 (2009).
15

See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 43–60
(1984).
16

17
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Id.
See id. at 150–54.
See id. at 61–77.
See id. at 68-69.
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cause.” In the absence of such contractual limitations, private sector
workers––and even some public sector personnel––are employed on an atwill basis, which means that they can be terminated at any time for almost
21
any reason. Under other contractual provisions, layoffs, recalls, and
promotions tend to be determined in a relatively objective manner. Least
senior employees are laid off ahead of their more senior colleagues, and more
senior individuals on layoff are recalled to work ahead of their less senior
cohorts. When vacant positions are being filled, senior bidders often have
priority ahead of equally qualified bidders with less seniority.
A critical factor in bargaining agreements concerns the inclusion of
grievance-arbitration provisions, which allow unit employees to challenge
22
employer decisions that may have violated contractual provisions. Such
clauses require labor and management representatives to work together to
23
resolve their disputes through the negotiation process. In the rare instances
in which mutual resolutions cannot be achieved, unions possess the right to
24
invoke arbitration. Outside neutrals conduct hearings and determine if the
employers have engaged in practices inconsistent with bargaining agreement
25
provisions. Individuals without such contractual protections only have the
“exit voice”––they either accept the decisions of their employers or look for
26
27
work elsewhere. It is this “voice face,” which enables organized workers
to meaningfully influence their basic employment conditions, that
differentiates them from their nonunion cohorts.

III. PUBLIC SECTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

20
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See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 13, at 930–32.
See id. at 925–30.
See id. at 197–276.
See id. at 199-201.
See id. at 240-49.
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 13, at 199-201.
See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 15, at 7–11, 94–95.
Id. at 94-95.
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The vast majority of public sector contracts have been achieved through
collective bargaining. Labor and management representatives work together
to achieve mutually acceptable contracts. When bargaining discussions
between the parties do not generate new contracts, the participants generally
obtain mediator assistance. The neutral facilitators meet with the disputing
parties to help them look for areas of agreement and to search for ways to
deal with their areas of disagreement. These mediators induce the negotiating
parties to go behind their stated positions to enable them to explore their
underlying interests. Why does the union wish to obtain a particular term? Is
there some other way in which the governmental employer might be able to
satisfy the union’s concerns in a manner more acceptable to the government
entity involved?
When bargaining impasses occur, individuals employed in states
authorizing work stoppages occasionally conduct strikes to advance their
interests. As members of the general public become adversely affected by
such job actions, they encourage their political leaders to seek appropriate
resolutions. Even in states in which such work stoppages are unlawful,
government employees may strike. Most of these stoppages do not go on for
prolonged periods, and agreements are often achieved before courts are asked
to enjoin the illegal job actions.
When work stoppages are illegal or not desired by the workers involved,
and mediator intervention has not generated new accords, the parties often
28
resort to fact-finding or interest arbitration. Fact-finders conduct hearings
29
and summarize the current positions of the parties. In some cases, they are
empowered to make non-binding recommendations with respect to the
30
manner in which they believe the conflicting terms should be resolved. The
bargaining parties may accept these recommendations, but they frequently do
not do so. They instead use the fact-finder’s conclusions and
31
recommendations as a basis for continued negotiations. These efforts
usually lead to final agreements.
In some jurisdictions, binding interest arbitration procedures are used to
32
resolve bargaining disputes. The management and labor representatives
28

29

30

31

32

See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 614–15.
See id.
See id. at 614.
See id.
See id. at 615–43.
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present their claims to an arbitral panel, which is empowered to determine
33
the terms of the new bargaining agreement. Although some arbitral panels
are authorized to determine the manner in which they think the disputed
terms should be resolved, most laws compel the arbitrators to select either the
final proposals of the government employer or the representative labor
organization. This may be done on a whole package basis or on an item-byitem basis. The panel is instructed to decide which party’s positions are more
reasonable.

IV. IMPACT OF LABOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES ON
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MOVEMENT
In the late 1960s, before I went to law school, I earned a master’s degree
in labor law and collective bargaining. In the Collective Bargaining course
34
we read A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, which described how
labor and management representatives should employ integrative bargaining
techniques to further their respective objectives. This innovative approach to
negotiating had been developed in the early part of the last century by a
35
business consultant named Mary Parker Follett.
To generate mutually efficient bargaining agreements, labor and
management representatives must go behind their stated positions and
explore their underlying interests. Which terms do union leaders desire that
are not that significant to employers (e.g., union security clause), and which
items do management officials value that are not that important to bargaining
unit members (e.g., no-strike provision)? By ensuring that these terms end up
on the appropriate side of the bargaining table, labor and management
negotiators can generate the largest joint surplus and ensure the attainment of
36
optimal accords. With respect to the items that are valued by both sides
(e.g., wages and fringe benefits)––the so-called “distributive” terms––
bargainers are likely to employ more competitive tactics to enable them to
37
claim a greater share of the surplus for their own side.
33

See id. at 615.

34

RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS (1965).
35

See generally JOAN C. TONN, MARY P. FOLLETT: CREATING DEMOCRACY,
TRANSFORMING MANAGEMENT 266–71 (2003).
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See WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 34, at 52-53.
See id. at 11–125.
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In the Collective Bargaining course, we also explored the use of
mediation to help parties achieve accords. We considered what the parties
and the neutral facilitator did during the joint bargaining sessions, and what
was done during the separate caucus sessions conducted by the mediator with
each party alone. In the separate Labor Arbitration course, we considered
both grievance arbitration, which concerns disputes arising during existing
agreements claiming violations of specific contractual terms, and interest
arbitration, which is used to resolve ongoing bargaining disputes over new
contracts.
When I became a law professor thirty-five years ago, I taught separate
courses in Negotiation, Labor Law, and Collective Bargaining and Labor
Arbitration. In my Negotiation course, I incorporated the integrative and
distributive bargaining concepts I had learned in graduate school. When
38
Getting to Yes was published, I was surprised to discover how many of the
concepts described by Walton and McKersie were adopted by Fisher and
Ury.
One of the first books I worked on was the third edition of Collective
39
Bargaining and Labor Arbitration. We described the bargaining process
and the use of grievance-arbitration procedures to resolve disputes arising
40
during the terms of collective contracts. The concepts covered were all
based upon the practices that had been employed by labor and management
representatives for many decades. When Russell Smith, Donald Rothschild,
and Leroy Merrifield had created the first edition of that book in 1970, they
had merely described how effectively these established dispute resolution
practices functioned.
I taught the Collective Bargaining and Labor Arbitration course for a
number of years, until the decline in union membership shifted the
pedagogical focus from collective labor relations law to individual
employment rights. By that same time, academics not associated with labor
and employment law had begun to appreciate the ways in which traditional
labor-management dispute resolution procedures could be extended to other
areas. They developed what has become known as alternative dispute
resolution, primarily by building upon the procedures that had been
employed for many decades in the labor-management field. When Edward

38

ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981).
39

TO

YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT

DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD, LEROY S. MERRIFIELD & CHARLES B. CRAVER,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION (3d ed. 1988).
40

Id. at 757.

8
Brunet and I developed our own alternative dispute resolution book in
41
1997, we did not think of this as an entirely new area. We had both served
as mediators and arbitrators, and appreciated the fact that conventional labormanagement dispute resolution techniques were being incorporated in many
other areas of legal practice. We thus find it interesting when alternative
dispute resolution experts behave as if they have developed wholly original
ways to resolve disputes, ignoring the procedures borrowed from well42
established labor-management practices.

V. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
For several decades, especially during the late 1980s and 1990s, the
United States economy grew expansively. Wages and fringe benefits for both
private and public sector workers increased––especially for unionrepresented employees. These developments made unionized private sector
employers less able to compete with nonunion firms, and caused many
43
companies to export jobs to low-wage countries and to work diligently to
induce their employees to decertify their representative labor organizations.
Since government employers did not face such competitive issues, due to the
monopoly aspect of most government-provided services, state and local
government employers did not seek to eliminate representative unions.
Many political leaders and their appointed administrators worked hard to
court the support of public sector union leaders and their members. This was
especially true in major union states like California, Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Politicians
realized that they could not agree to excessive salary levels, both because of
the immediate impact on government budgets and the fact that private sector
workers would complain about such elevated public employee wages. They
instead agreed to generous defined–benefit pension plans they thought would
not become visible for many years in the future, and to expansive health care

41

EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE (1997).
42

See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Labor Unions on Worker Rights and Other
Social Movements, 26 J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 267, 276–78 (2011) (describing the impact of
labor movement on ADR procedures).
43

See generally STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE (2008); THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005).
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programs, which did not have elevated premiums when they were initially
44
implemented in the 1980s.
As the post-war baby boom generation moves into retirement over the
next three decades, state and local governments will have to deal with the
fact they have not set aside sufficient funds to cover the expensive pension
costs that will be involved. Many of the bargaining agreements covering such
persons continue to provide retirees and their dependents with supplemental
Medicare coverage that will increasingly drain government coffers.
Over the past four years, many unionized private sector unions have had
to agree to wage freezes and, in some cases, even wage reductions. Many
have accepted employer demands that future employees receive only
defined–contribution pension payments instead of more generous defined–
benefit plan coverage. To retain meaningful health care protection, many
labor organizations have had to accept increased deductibles and copayments, and elevated worker premium contributions. As a result of the dire
economic situations facing many state and local governments due to rising
costs and decreasing revenues, most government employers are going to have
to address these same issues in the coming years.
Several states have sought to avoid the need to address these critical
issues at the collective bargaining table by reducing the scope of their
bargaining statutes or through the complete repeal of such laws. These
approaches are contrary to the basic principles of industrial democracy, and
are entirely unnecessary. Public officials need to respect the right of
government workers to have a collective voice, but must use the bargaining
process to address these economic matters.
Private sector concession bargaining is complicated by the fact that union
leaders are political persons who do not wish to be voted out of office.
Employers seeking wage and benefit curtailments have to allow the union
negotiators to put on public performances, which can occasionally become
offensive. They portray corporate leaders as greedy, and engage in
aggressive bargaining tactics designed to convince their members that they
are fighting hard to protect their interests. They may even have to generate
short-term work stoppages that will remind their members how difficult it is
to live with no income. In the end, they almost always acknowledge the
economic realities and reluctantly accept the required reductions.
Public sector bargaining is more complicated than private sector
negotiating for two principal reasons. First, the absence of any profit motive
makes it hard for employer representatives to demonstrate the true need for
44

Some of these pension and health care plans were achieved through traditional
collective bargaining. In states in which such fringe benefits are set by state legislators
and are not subject to regular bargaining, union representatives used their negotiating
skills to achieve such programs by way of lobbying efforts.

10
labor cost reductions. Most persons think that government entities can
simply raise taxes to cover increased labor costs, unlike their private sector
counterparts, which may be facing the real possibility of bankruptcy. The
second factor concerns the fact that political leaders are on both sides of the
bargaining table. Not only are the union leaders concerned about their
reelection, but so are the government officials involved. If they do not
achieve agreements minimizing increased labor costs, they may be forced to
increase taxes, which is difficult to defend in a negative economic
environment. On the other hand, if they demand too much from the union
leadership, they may forfeit substantial labor contributions to their reelection
funds and induce their workers to support other candidates in future
elections.
Despite the political risks associated with public sector bargaining during
difficult times, states and municipalities should not restrict or eliminate their
bargaining laws. They should instead use the procedures set forth in those
statutes to achieve the results they require. In many cases, they should be
able to accomplish their objectives through the normal bargaining process. In
those situations where bargaining impasses are reached, they should employ
modified alternative dispute resolution procedures to assist the bargaining
parties.

VI. USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES TO
RESOLVE PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING DISPUTES
The fundamental form of dispute resolution involves interparty
negotiations. The two sides come to the bargaining table and work together
to achieve mutually acceptable terms. Public employers often rush this
process because they naively think that agreements should be generated
expeditiously. They fail to appreciate the political nature of these
interactions. Most public sector labor organizations lack significant
bargaining power due to the no-strike provisions included in most state
bargaining laws. As a result, much of what occurs is more akin to collective
begging instead of collective bargaining. The union representatives state their
demands and hope that politically friendly employer representatives will
provide their members with decent employment terms. They recognize that if
employer concessions are not forthcoming, there is little they can do at the
bargaining table to compel position modifications.
Public sector employers need to be patient and persevering. They should
allow the bargaining process to develop in a deliberate manner. Most unions
bring a number of national, regional, and local officials to bargaining
sessions, and the primary spokespersons must put on shows for those
individuals––and for the interested bargaining unit personnel. The more of a
show put on by the labor representatives, the more likely it is that those
persons recognize the fact they will have to give in to the employer positions.

11
Studies show that when people negotiate, they are more satisfied with
objectively less beneficial terms when they think the bargaining process has
been fair and they have been treated respectfully than when they are
45
dissatisfied with the overall process. This is why government
representatives must tolerate occasional union negotiator outbursts and allow
the discussions to go on for prolonged periods.
Rarely does a continuation of the status quo favor the workers. In most
cases, a continuation of existing policies actually favors management. When
government employers require minimal salary increases––or occasionally
compensation reductions––changes in pension plans and increased employee
contributions to health care coverage, the workers desire other non-monetary
changes. Even when pension plans and health care coverage are not formally
subject to bargaining resolution, government representatives should negotiate
with union leaders about the political needs for the requested changes and
endeavor to determine what they can provide to workers in exchange for the
cost reductions being sought. Patient government negotiators should be able
to trade the cost reduction terms they require for the non-monetary issues of
interest to the other side.
Government negotiators who need cost reductions must prepare
thoroughly for their bargaining interactions. They must appreciate the fact
that individuals are more negatively affected by losses than they are
46
positively affected by gains. It is thus beneficial for government entities
seeking reduced labor costs to emphasize the gains workers will obtain
through these reductions––continued employment among them. If public
employers propose layoffs if costs are not curtailed, most workers will be
more amenable to the less disastrous reductions in wages or fringe benefits.
Even persons who feel that their own positions are safe are likely to accept
reasonable reductions that will protect the jobs of their colleagues.
Government bargaining representatives must articulate their needs in a
clear manner and demonstrate objectively why they require the terms they
are seeking. They must listen carefully to union counteroffers and explore the
underlying interests of the parties. A perfect example concerns the need to
reduce expanding health care costs. Many employers initially seek an
increase in worker premiums, unaware of the politically negative impact of
such increases on union officials. Healthy employees dislike premium
increases because such deductions decrease their take-home pay. On the
45

Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 412–20
(2010); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 473, 473 (2008).
46

See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 304–05 (2011).
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other hand, union leaders are often willing to accomplish the requisite cost
savings through increases in worker deductibles and co-payments. When
individuals require expensive medical treatment, they are relieved to have
health care coverage. They generally accept the relatively minimal amounts
they have to contribute to their total costs more readily than healthy persons
accept increased premiums. Government employers may similarly work to
replace expensive defined–benefit pension plans with less costly defined–
contribution plans by demonstrating to both workers and their representative
unions the fact that they lack the financial resources to continue the defined–
benefit programs.
When bargaining talks have continued for prolonged periods with
minimal progress, the assistance of skilled mediators can be especially
beneficial. If the parties have the opportunity to select their own neutral
facilitator, they should look for someone who is a skilled and empathetic
communicator and who understands the unique nature of public sector
collective bargaining interactions. In other cases, the neutral participants will
be selected by state mediation services.
Mediation sessions are usually attended by the more significant party
representatives, and they are conducted in private, which diminishes the need
for either side to put on shows for their constituencies. During joint sessions,
mediators ask many questions designed to explore the articulated issues and
their underlying interests. They want to be sure that each side fully
understands the reasons for the positions taken by the opposing party. When
neither side seems amenable to compromise, they explore the underlying
interests and try to induce brainstorming discussions that may generate
options not contemplated by the bargaining parties. They hope to engender
further bargaining discussions that may lead to mutual accords. The two
factors which provide mediators with bargaining power include the fact that
they have no authority to tell either side what to do and their complete
neutrality.
When joint sessions are not moving toward an agreement, either the
47
mediator or the parties may suggest separate caucus sessions. The
information each party receives during such discussions may not be
communicated to the other side without the express consent of the speakers.
In these separate sessions, mediators often ask each side what they should
know that they have not already been told. This inquiry is designed to induce
each side to let the mediators know what they are really concerned about.
Sometimes labor or management representatives raise concerns that can
easily be addressed, while at other times significant issues are brought up. In

47

See CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 328–
30 (6th ed. 2009).

13
the latter situations, the neutral facilitators must work with that party to
look for options that would have the least negative consequences.
In many bargaining circumstances, neither side is willing to modify its
stated positions for fear the other party will not reciprocate its changes.
Mediators can be of significant assistance in this regard. They can work to
induce simultaneous position changes. When both sides seem hesitant to
move in this manner, mediators can occasionally accomplish the desired
48
result through conditional concessions. In separate caucus sessions, the
neutrals ask the employer if it would increase its offer by specific amounts
with respect to particular terms if the labor organization would agree to
reciprocal reductions in its demands with respect to the same terms. The
labor organization is then asked if it would decrease its demands if the
employer would increase its offers. In this face-saving manner, mediators can
slowly bring the parties together. This is why proficient mediators frequently
help bargaining parties reach agreements they thought could not be achieved.
When mediation efforts do not generate accords, fact-finding sessions
can be helpful. These may be conducted by the persons who had already
been serving as mediators due to their familiarity with the issues in dispute,
or they may be conducted by different individuals who can only consider the
information the parties decide to provide in formal hearings. The different
sides explain their positions and the reasons supporting those proposals. The
fact-finder then describes the party positions and determines the operative
economic and factual circumstances. Even if the fact-finder is not
empowered to issue any recommendations, his or her report can be helpful
since it is likely to induce the parties to reexamine the validity of their
underlying positions.
In most cases where fact-finding is employed, the fact-finder is
empowered to issue nonbinding recommendations indicating the way in
which he or she believes the different terms should be resolved. This can be
especially beneficial where the fact-finder’s report will be made public,
because those recommendations can provide government and union
49
negotiators “with the political cover they need to resolve their dispute.” If
some reductions in services or tax increases, or both, are necessitated, the
government representatives can blame the fact-finder, as can the union
representatives when they have to explain to their constituents why they
50
could not obtain more beneficial terms. The most significant drawback to

48

49

50

Id. at 330–31.
MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 614.

In some cases, fact-finders are actually asked to make recommendations which
reflect positions already tentatively agreed upon by the negotiating parties, but which

14
fact-finding concerns the fact that the neutral person’s recommendations
are not binding. One or both sides can reject those suggestions and continue
to fight for their own positions.
In the relatively rare cases in which the bargaining parties are unable to
achieve final accords with or without the assistance of mediators or fact51
finders, binding interest arbitration may be employed. Usually a panel of
52
three arbitrators is created. The disputing parties present their final positions
and the rationales supporting those positions. At the conclusion of the
hearings, the arbitrators decide the final terms of the new contract. They may
be authorized to resolve the controverted issues in any manner they think
appropriate, based upon factors set forth in the applicable bargaining
53
statute, but in many instances they are required to determine which party’s
submitted positions are more reasonable. Providing arbitrators with broad
discretion to determine the new contract terms often results in compromise
awards, which provide the public employers with some issues and the
54
representative unions with other items.
In some cases, the arbitrators must compare the final party offers on a
complete package basis. They examine all of the proposed terms and decide
which total package is more reasonable. The fact that the arbitrators must
select the entire package of either the employer or the labor organization
deprives them of any way to split the different terms. On the other hand, this
all-or-nothing approach may result in the imposition of individually
unreasonable terms that are included within the more reasonable total
package of one party.
To avoid this difficulty, many state bargaining laws authorize the
arbitrators to determine the reasonableness of the respective party final offers
on an issue-by-issue basis. The neutrals examine each proposed term
separately and decide which one is more reasonable. This approach enables
the arbitrators to reject particular proposals they do not consider appropriate.
On the other hand, it encourages arbitration panels to award some terms to
they are hesitant to announce themselves––fearing political repercussions if they must
take personal responsibility for those terms.
51

See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 615–74.

52

In some cases, the person who served as the mediator is either designated as the
lone interest arbitrator or as the head of the arbitration panel. Such a mediation/arbitration
procedure can be beneficial due to the fact that the principal decisionmaker is thoroughly
familiar with the underlying circumstances and the actual positions of the parties.
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the public employer and others to the representative union in an effort to
satisfy both sides. It also encourages the bargaining parties to include some
unimportant––and often unreasonable––items in their final offers they hope
55
arbitrators will reject in favor of other terms they really desire.
Issue-by-issue arbitration tends to achieve results similar to those the
parties should have been able to generate through collective bargaining
procedures. By rejecting the less reasonable terms in favor or the more
reasonable terms and by effectively trading some terms for other issues,
arbitrators do exactly what disputing parties do when they resolve conflicting
positions through conventional bargaining. As a result, it does not seem
unreasonable for arbitrators to possess the authority to divide the different
items in such a compromising fashion.
Economically weak labor organizations have a strong incentive to resort
to binding interest arbitration to resolve their bargaining controversies. This
is based on the fact that the worst they could do is end up with the final offers
articulated by the public employers. On the other hand, since many
arbitration panels try to accommodate both sides when they are authorized to
determine the different items on an issue-by-issue basis, the unions generally
obtain more than they were able to claim at the bargaining table. Rational
union leaders would be irrational if they did not take advantage of this aspect
of the interest arbitration process.
To offset the fact that unions cannot lose under current interest
arbitration procedures by going to arbitration, states might consider changes
in their statutes that would encourage both parties to work out their
differences at the bargaining table. They could provide that when arbitral
panels determine under issue-by-issue procedures that the public employer’s
final proposals are more reasonable than those articulated by the labor
organization, they could subtract the difference––or perhaps one-half or onequarter the distance––between the final offers of the union and the final
offers of the government employer from their awards with respect to those
issues. The legislature could similarly provide that when the final offers of
the representative union are found to be more reasonable than those of the
public entity, the panel must add that difference––or one-half or one-quarter
that distance––to the awards pertaining to those terms.
This approach would have two significant benefits. First, it would negate
the no-loss incentive of representative labor organizations to invoke
arbitration on a regular basis, since they cannot presently do worse than what
they have already been offered. They would have to carefully weigh the
possibility they could end up with less generous final terms through
arbitration than they are being offered at the bargaining table. Second, such
an approach would greatly encourage labor and management representatives
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to make final offers that are truly rational given the current economic
circumstances affecting the negotiating parties. This would bring the parties
closer together and enhance the likelihood they would achieve mutually
acceptable terms through their own bargaining efforts.
The most significant criticism of public sector interest arbitration
concerns the fact that politically unaccountable outsiders make
determinations that affect both city and state budgets and the manner in
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which important government services are to be provided. Unlike grievance
arbitration proceedings, which only involve the interpretation of contractual
terms agreed upon by the parties themselves, interest arbitration proceedings
enable external neutrals to decide what the actual terms of future contracts
will be. This provides these arbitrators with significant authority. On the
other hand, such arbitral determinations are almost always constrained by the
final proposals submitted by the bargaining parties. The arbitrators are not
authorized to impose conditions not explored by the parties themselves.
States have two ways to avoid interest arbitration. They could repeal or
limit public sector bargaining laws in a way that deprives outside neutrals of
authority over basic terms of employment. A perfect example is provided by
the federal government, which severely limits the scope of bargaining to
items not related to wages and fringe benefits and which do not concern the
basic mission of the agencies involved. While this approach might be
politically popular during difficult economic times, it is contrary to the
notion of industrial democracy. Most of the problems currently affecting
government employers with bargaining laws are not due to the statutes
themselves, but to the tendency of political leaders to curry favor with union
officials. If they had the courage to stand up to labor negotiators when
necessary to advance government interests, these problems could be
minimized.
At the other extreme, states could authorize public sector work
stoppages––at least for non-essential personnel. Most strikes would not
continue for prolonged periods due to the fact that most persons today lack
the finances to support themselves for more than brief periods without
defaulting on their economic obligations. In addition, if members of the
public thought the union demands were excessive, they could encourage their
government employers to hold the line at the bargaining table. On the other
hand, if they were unwilling to withstand longer shutdowns or thought the
workers deserved enhanced employment conditions, they could encourage
their political leaders to grant the workers the increases being sought.

VII. CONCLUSION
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Labor organizations have existed in the United States for many decades.
Private sector unions have used collective bargaining procedures and
occasional work stoppages to enhance the wages and fringe benefits of
bargaining unit personnel and to protect such persons from unfair treatment.
As states have enacted public sector bargaining statutes enabling their own
employees to unionize and bargain collectively, government personnel have
improved their employment conditions.
For over one hundred years, private sector employers and representative
labor organizations have used the bargaining process to achieve collective
agreements. When negotiation difficulties have been encountered, the two
sides have employed mediation assistance to assist them. To resolve issues
that have developed during the terms of existing contracts, disputants have
employed grievance–arbitration procedures to initially negotiate with each
other. In the relatively few cases in which mutual resolutions could not be
achieved, arbitration hearings have been conducted. Over the past three
decades, individuals have developed the alternative dispute resolution
movement, which borrowed most of its procedures from these wellestablished labor–management practices.
Deteriorating economic conditions have forced government employers to
look for ways to slow the growth of––or even reduce––the high cost of labor.
Generous defined–benefit pension plans are not adequately funded, and the
cost of expansive health care coverage has risen much faster than the
Consumer Price Index. Politically accountable government representatives
do not dare to raise taxes very much, nor do they wish to offend powerful
public sector labor organizations by demanding cost reductions at the
bargaining table. As a result, several state legislatures have reduced the scope
of public sector bargaining laws, or repealed them entirely. Instead of
resorting to such drastic measures, government entities should employ
alternative dispute resolution techniques to deal with their bargaining
problems.
They should initially use the traditional bargaining process to obtain the
changes they require. They must appreciate the political nature of labor
leaders and allow union representatives to prolong bargaining talks in a
manner that would enable them to put on shows for their members. When
interparty negotiations begin to falter, mediation assistance would be
beneficial. If agreements still cannot be generated, fact-finders can help to
determine the underlying economic issues and recommend solutions they
think appropriate.
When government employers and labor leaders are still unable to reach
accords, many states employ binding interest arbitration. Arbitration panels
conduct hearings and determine how the different terms should be resolved.
Most often, arbitral panels must select the more reasonable final proposals
set forth by the two sides––either on a total package basis or on an issue-by-
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issue basis. Since labor unions have nothing to lose by undermining the
bargaining process and waiting until they can invoke interest arbitration,
legislatures could direct the panels to reduce their awards to the extent, or
partial extent, that less reasonable union demands exceed the more
reasonable employer offers. Arbitration panels could similarly be directed to
increase their awards to the extent, or partial extent, that the less generous
employer positions fall below the more reasonable union positions.
It is ironic that the alternative dispute resolution procedures being
suggested to resolve current public sector bargaining impasses are the
equivalent of the procedures which labor and management representatives
have employed for many decades. This truly demonstrates that the more
things change, the more they remain the same.

